Performance Evaluation of Australian Universities -are public and private sector partnerships possible in tertiary education?
1.0
Introduction In October, 2000 an Australian parliamentary inquiry was initiated into " the capacity of public universities to meet Australia's higher education needs" 1 , with particular reference to, • funding arrangements, • the increasing reliance on private funding and the associated effect of universities' abilities to meet Australia's education, training and research needs, • public liability consequences of private, commercial activities of universities, • the equality of opportunity to participate in higher education, • the capacity of public universities to contribute to economic growth, • the regulation of higher education in the global environment • and the nature and sufficiency of independent advice to government on higher education matters.
This inquiry was precipitated by community outcry and even outrage over alleged deterioration in the quality of education as evidenced by falling staff to student numbers, overcrowding in lecture halls, claims that students buy assignments and can rort the system, and that overseas full fee paying students are given preference over local partial fee paying students. Deterioration in research has been linked to claims that output is only geared to promotion, and to industry-funded initiatives. Hence the capacity of Australian universities to contribute to economic growth through research and development has been significantly eroded. The latter claim led to a major policy change in Australia towards research and development, referred to herein as "The Innovations Statement".
2
The rationale for applying agency theory is to isolate potential conflicts in attempting to meet publicly determined needs (as determined by government priorities, modified by private sector demands) from a mix of public funding via government grants and private sector sources (student fees, direct contributions, consulting and pre-university education). Conflicts can exist in that competing demand and limited supply do not always produce an optimum mix of research and educational output in terms of the quantity and quality of graduates and postgraduates with qualifications appropriate to industry needs, and in terms of the type of research output that can contribute to short term and long term economic growth in communities, regions, and exports. The contribution of education related service exports was A$1.073 billion for the September, 2000 quarter which was 12% of the total international trade in services in Australia. 3 The provision of university education is also seen as an export industry which can create further conflicts in that a large number of institutions are competing domestically and globally for limited resources, in terms of student fees. In the Australian tertiary education sector, overseas students are full fee paying, while domestic students 4 only contribute partially to the cost of higher education, through the HECS (Higher Education Contribution Scheme) with the shortfall supposedly made up from government grants on a matching basis. However due to either inefficiencies in the administration of university education, or the application of a funding formula for domestic students, Australian universities are experiencing cash flow problems. This paper will attempt to establish which explanation can be substantiated by the application of objective financial analytical techniques. In doing so, be necessary to resort not only to agency theory but an actual examination of reporting systems for universities. Agency conflicts can influence not only the basic economic problem of the allocation of limited resources, (Section 2.0), but also whether the reporting systems of universities are inadequate in terms of adequate transparency and disclosure necessary to promote full accountability. The latter objective is achieved in Section 3.0 by comparing the accounts of one of the newest of Australian universities, the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS, created out of an amalgamation of several technical colleges in 1990) to the oldest, the University of Sydney, (USYD) established 150 years ago, and to the University of NSW (UNSW), as well as to the reporting practices of public listed companies. The universities in the sample were chosen due to close location, similar number of enrolments and comparable revenue structures. Difficulties are posed in such a comparison by the diversity between Australian universities. Meek and Wood (1998) analyse this diversity into five components -systemic diversity (the different types of institutions), arising from structural diversity (differences in history, constitution, time of emergence, sibling order, governance structures, fields of study and location) 5 , programmatic diversity (differences in approaches to teaching and learning at all levels eg distance education, flexible, internet, traditional, as well as programmes of pure vs applied vs strategic research with or without industry and community input), inputs (financial, academic, students, educational) 6 , and outputs, such as the range of qualifications of graduates, or the range of research and development contributions. Section 4.0 then attempts to apply private sector measures of efficiency, liquidity and sustainable growth to several Australian universities, once again using an old and new contrast. This analysis is pertinent to the survival of Australian universities in the 21 st century, as they emerge from purely publicly funded to universities to ones dependant on public/private sector partnerships. For instance in 1994, the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) received 72% of its funds from direct government grants (largely Commonwealth) and from indirect government sources related to the Higher Education Contribution Scheme, which subsidises the shortfall paid by domestic students. In 1999 only 60% of UTS's funds were received from this source, the rest coming from student fees and charges, research, investment income, scholarships and prizes, donations and bequests and other private sector type activities. In 1999, the University of Sydney had a similar breakdown between public and private sector funding -60:40. The ratio of direct government grants to total revenue was only 42% for UTS in 1999, compared to USYD at 52.5% and UNSW (see Appendix 1). That is, universities have to solicit students and compete for research funds from all sources for half their funds. As publicly owned institutions they are in effect already in a partnership with the private sector. Apart from quantitative measures, qualitative measures of the success of private and public partnerships in tertiary education, that is, teaching, research and innovation are vital to an evaluation of a service industry. These measures are discussed in Section 5.0. The logical conclusion to this performance evaluation is a scenario analysis -given current pressures on universities to be self funding, is more private participation possible via loans or direct investment (Section 6.0)? Or is the solution to increase the number of overseas full fee paying students, and/or change the funding formula for higher education? The dilemma of Australian universities is replicated in many countries that are moving towards deregulation of all sectors, and towards an open market economy. The final choices made by governments will ultimately be determined by the electorate in a democracy. * 2.0 Agency theory applied to Public and Private Partnerships using Australian Universities as an example According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency relationships arise where there is a contract under which one party (the principal or owner) engages another party (the agent) to perform some service on behalf of the principal. As the management task of any publicly owned entity is placed in the hands of managers who not owners, their interests may not be aligned with those of the owners, the latter having goals of maximising the value of the firm and hence their own wealth. The interests of managers may be increased compensation or prestige recognition at the expense of shareholders' interests. Lack of goal congruency equals an agency problem and can be resolved by incurring three costs -• monitoring costs which are incurred by shareholders to monitor management performance; • bonding costs incurred by management when they try to prove to shareholders they are acting in the shareholders' interests, such as preparation of quarterly financial statements.
• Residual loss, incurred as a result of the deviation in management and shareholders' objectives. If there is an efficient managerial market, monitoring by fellow managers within the firm, if market discipline can exist, such as the threat of takeovers, and if managerial incentive schemes are not dysfunctional, then there should by no agency problem. In the market for universities, which are 100% government owned, and still largely publicly funded, it is difficult for the usual market mechanisms to exist, particularly as regards bonding costs. Relevant to the latter topic is a study of the remuneration practices in the banking industry. Although part of private sector, incorrect bonding and monitoring has large residual loss implications for the private sector, when bailouts and rescues have to be mounted by governments. The topic has been reviewed by financial system regulators, such as the Bank of England (Davies, 1997) . In November 1997 the UK regulator organised a formal seminar on incentives and regulation, which covered the 5 In Australia this can lead to a classification of universities as sandstones, redbricks, unitechs, gumtrees and new with a metropolitan vs regional dimension. 6 Involving an analysis of government vs non-government sources, research funding as a proportion of total, characertics of students (ages, types, backgrounds, undergraduate vs postgraduate, balance, proportion of research students, Australian vs international ) while educational resources and capacity mean facilities, equipment, libraries, laboratories, and land. topic of the importance of properly designed remuneration schemes for bank management. The Bank of England summarised the findings thus:
"The control environment within the firm is set not by the shareholders, but by managers. Firms can try to overcome this principal/agent problem through the careful design of compensation schemesbut this is not simple. ...inadequately-designed schemes can create perverse incentives" (Bank of England, 1998, p.34 ). This has been confirmed in a number of separate studies -Davies, (1997) , Demsetz and Saidenberg, (1998) , Hubbard and Palia, (1995) , and Instefjord, Jackson, and Perraudin, (1998) . In universities in Australia, salary supplementation has been introduced as a form of managerial incentive as salaries are set fairly uniformly on an industry basis by the two principal union organisations (one for the academics and one for the support staff), in an arbitration system. Salary sacrifice (a form of tax effective salary packaging which was introduced despite union objections), plus other incentives ( such as extra paid teaching, the award of overseas trips to conferences), the provision of a car and at top levels housing (at the Vice-Chancellor level, equivalent to Managing Director of a firm), are the only move towards bonding. However these are not objectively determined via a free market for managerial or academic services, as certain historic practices (derived from the origins of universities as a feudal institutions) prohibit monitoring such as reference to market related remuneration. The criteria can be slanted by management in its favour -for instance the number of publications, rather than the contribution to revenue from teaching activities. Hence the same dysfunctional effect on the number of academics and their quality may be induced by incorrectly designed packages. Application of an agency framework enhances the understanding of problems faced by Australian universities in the new millennium in effecting a partnership of private and public sector funding in the following ways.
2.1
Agency Conflicts Stakeholders of a university include the government as the principal, (both Federal and State), any lenders (usually suppliers, as most wholly owned government entities are prohibited from borrowing, unless under special circumstances) 7 , employees (principally of two types -academics and administration), and unions.
8 Students constitute another group of principals, as consumers wanting to ensure adequate money is spent to maintain the best possible service, infrastructure, staffing and research. Each of these parties has a vested interest in the performance of the university and hence in reporting mechanisms. Expectations devolving around those interests if non congruent may lead to conflicts, even within the same stakeholder group. For instance, the government (taken to mean both levels in this initial analysis) has two roles -it regulates all reporting and therefore must ensure its own organisations abide by accounting standards and corporate laws of disclosure. In this sense it is noteworthy that the oldest university in Australia, the University of Sydney, was four months late in its reporting, and similar to other universities its audit report contains an "inherent uncertainty" qualification 9 . The accounts of three universities examined all contained qualifications in the notes 10 , which can be taken as evidence of disputes between those monitoring the accounts on behalf of the principals and those producing the accounts. Apart from demanding compliance in reporting, the government as principal has a second role, setting performance goals which are linked to the proportion of funds allocated to a university. A traditional conflict of any manager with a principal is that the former wishes to be viewed as performing efficiently and successfully in meeting those goals, in order to gain a greater share of the total funding supplied. As noted there has been a significant change over the last decade of the last millennium for universities to rely on private sector revenue.
7 UTS was allowed to arrange a standby line of $30 million guaranteed by the State government in order to purchase a building which for 2 years was occupied by the Sydney Olympics Committee Organisation (SOCOG's rent of A$6 million was deducted from the purchase price). As at the date of this article this line has not been utilised as the University has used its accumulated cash reserves. However the cost of developing the site is estimated to be far in excess of the arranged line of credit (A$200 million). 8 The union representing academics is the NTEU and that for administrative staff is the CPSU, although conflicts have emerged during wage negotiations between the latter. 9 This relates to intergovernmental disputes regarding the amount owing from Commonwealth and State governments for their contributions to universities' unfunded superannuation liabilities uncertainty for State Superannuation Schemes. 10 See Section 3.1 Evidence of the conflict between the agents of management, employees and unions on the one hand demanding higher perquisites, and the principals, governments and students, demanding high performance with minimal funding input is in the choice of performance measures. One measure of university performance is the number of enrolments and quality of graduates. Typical indicators used by the level of government providing the major source of public funds is, • Ratio of general staff to academic staff on a full time equivalent basis (the lower the better), • Research income per research staff (the higher the better), • Diversity of course offering (more scores higher),
• Overseas students as a share of all students (the higher equals more private sector funding, deemed to be good), • Share of students studying part-time or externally (since part time students are not funded on resource consumption basis, the lower the percentage, the better for the university, but not for the region or economy), • Ratio of undergraduate to postgraduate students (similar to overseas students, the lower the better for the university as postgraduates are full fee paying students and constitute an important component of private sector funding), • Share of students aged 25 years or over (can lower the standard if these students are gaining entry on mature age status rules, which can mean that they did not gain a secondary school qualification) 11 . These statistical measures have been supplemented by quality measures, such as exit polls of university students upon graduation. Both types of measures have been criticised. The former statistical measures do not provide a measure of demand -that is number of students giving a university its first preference, or the starting salaries of graduates. Qualitative measures can be influenced by deliberately targeted "pep talks of symbiotic relationships -by convincing students that the prestige of their degree is linked to the prestige of their institutions". Other studies have used different measures such as 12 , • whether a university has a medical faculty or research school, (positive if yes), • the proportion of undergraduates who came in a backdoor entry method 13 (negative if large from the viewpoint of maintenance of quality, but positive if achieves political goals and is supplementing a deterioration in number of first year applicants),
• the proportion of all students in distance education (same qualification as previously), • the proportion of research students to total (indicative of prestige and reputation as is research income as a proportion of total income), • uncontested private income as a proportion of total income (the higher the better if the target is for universities to achieve more sustainable growth from the private sector). These measures are attempting to resolve the conflict between the two major principal groups -the government trying to minimise the allocation of public funds, and students who demand customer satisfaction. Management can recognise that customer retention and the ability to attract new customers is vital to its survival only when public and private sector funding is linked to that ability. Within the stakeholder group of management, conflict may exist if the University Council promotes the interests of particular faculties, schools or departments on non objective criteria, using one to subsidise another. For instance a common criticism of university management is the use of popular faculties, such as Business or Computing Studies, to accumulate funds to subsidise other faculties with far lower levels of student demand for their courses. This may be done for prestige reasons or because a certain faculty, such as Science, attracts large research grants and funding formula are changed to make government grants more dependent on the ability to attract research funds, than students. The employee groups of administration and academia can often be in open conflict regarding resolution of quality versus quantity problems, and also in the consumption of perquisites, particularly where the full time administrative to academic staff ratio is large (ranges from 1.7:1 to 1:1 across Australian universities), with these ratios increasing.
14 Often the true extent of total non-academic staff costs are concealed so that annual reports appear to give the impression that the largest share of costs is for academic salaries. Accounts surveyed in this 11 DETYA (1999b) . 12 Marginson, S (1999), "Diversity and convergence in Australian higher education, Australian Universities' Review, Vol. 42, No. 1, . 13 In Australia this involves gaining the equivalent of a credit average (65%) in all subjects in a TAFE (a technical college). 14 For instance at UTS the ratio has increased from 1.39 in 1993 to 1.53 in 1999, a 10% increase. study illustrate this point. For instance in the 1999 accounts of UTS, academic activities and other academic support services were reported at A$168 million, 74.8% of total operating expenses. Upon reading the notes to the accounts, only 30.7% were attributable to academic staff salaries and related costs, the major other items being non academic staff costs comprising 32.1% and other expensesstudent services, public services, buildings and grounds, administration and other general institutional services. The notes to UNSW's report confirm similar lumping in of non academic with academic, due to failure to specify appropriately what academic activities are (see Section 3.1 below). This style of reporting throws into doubt the DETYA measures of relative expenditure of central administrative vs academic activities, showing a range across universities which could be grossly understated of 16.6% (UNSW) to 42.7% (UWS). This is a result of internal agency conflicts between categories of employees but also between managers and principals, with the former seeking to maintain funding, and increase their level of perquisites while effecting efficiency cuts by increasing the ratio of students to staff and full fee paying students to partial fee payers. Such reporting also misleads a key stakeholder -the public who perceive the remuneration levels of the average academic being out of kilter with their input, whereas the reality is that only one third of university expenses can be related to the payment of those actually providing the teaching and research services, and salaries of the average academic have only risen in line with inflation.
15 A conclusion of administrative inefficiency on a micro and industry level would be in line with studies of industries where more private sector style of management is required, and more accountable reporting and commercial management a necessity (OECD, 2000; World Bank, 1995) . Unions also complicate the agency problem in that many employees want to move from union bargaining to enterprise bargaining or even to case by case arrangements. Donators of research funds may want industry linked research. From a university perspective although these organisations may want their contribution recognised, a university may fear a reduction in government grants, similar to a company fearing increased taxation or investigation by competition watchdogs if high profits are reported. The next section discusses the manner in which the reporting function of the universities contributes to resolution of agency conflicts through monitoring, bonding and minimisation of residual losses.
3.0
Reporting practices of Australian Universities -is disclosure adequate according to private sector disclosure rules? The agents of any university are entrusted with the responsibility of running the university on behalf of its shareholders -in the case of Australian universities, the audit reports are directed to the State government due to historical reasons of establishment or ownership, but with the department in charge of funding 16 , conducting its own audits of quality and quantity of output of teaching and research.
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Similar to all other organisations, Australian universities have an obligation to present financial reports, which disclose the financial position of the University. As a result of this requirement to disclose conflicts may arise as to the matter in which the agents' prepare and present the reports. As pointed out in the previous section, in a typical Australian university, the university Council, headed by the Chancellor (equivalent to a Chairman) with responsibility delegated to the Vice-Chancellor (Managing Director) holds ultimate management control. Australian universities then delegate responsibility to faculties, schools or departments thereof, research centres, executive development units, and consulting and external educational arms (which may be separate corporate entities). As the statements are prepared and formulated by the Council itself, through the Registrar's division, although there is an independent auditor's report, additional non audited information is given. Convincing all relevant parties that the reports have not been constructed to enhance the work performed by the Council may be difficult. Hence this section seeks to determine whether the agency conflicts detailed above have led to distortion, lack of transparency and disclosure by first comparing the reports of several Australian universities, and second comparing them to a sample of publicly listed companies. Director's report, and Auditor's report and Financial Statements. Thus Australian universities fall between two legislations, • that of the Commonwealth to whom they are accountable for funding and to whom they must furnish (through DETYA) information about student numbers, staffing, financial information, and academic performance of staff, • that of the State or Territory in which they are located to whom they are required to provide an audited annual report. The legislative position of the universities is highlighted by an uncertainty qualification in the audit report of all the universities, which was referred to in Section 2.1 as evidence of agency conflicts, regarding the responsibility for the unfunded superannuation (pension) liabilities of the universities as employers -that is, whether it is a State or Commonwealth liability. To illustrate how the reporting comparisons are influenced by this dual legislative responsibility the report of the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) is compared to that of the University of Sydney (USYD) and the University of NSW (UNSW), with reference to the accounts of the University of Western Sydney, due to a recent inquiry regarding its level of administrative expenses (Walker, 2000) . Despite the diversity analysed by Meek and Wood (1998), this comparison highlights common agency conflicts. The UTS annual report provides a benchmark for the comparisons below. It begins with a transmittal letter to the State Education Minister (necessary because of the origins of universities as State owned entities). This letter's purpose is to emphasise any current difficulties -in this case those posed by funding cuts. The financial statements and audit report are at the back of the report. Emphasised in the presentation are the Vice-Chancellor's Message, and sections on strategy, teaching, learning, research, internationalisation, university life, community, organisation and financial management. Each of the reports of the four different universities emphasise different aspects, the content of which was not dictated by accounting standards or the corporations law, but by the desire to meet performance measures of the quality and quantity of teaching and research as dictated by DETYA yardsticks (DETYA, 1997b (DETYA, , 1999b . Whereas UTS and UWS emphasise funding cuts, 18 the other two universities emphasise their strengths -USYD its excellence in research, and teaching while UNSW's report is more similar to a private sector company, emphasising business aspects such as facilities and risk management. Common to all the universities are qualifications in the notes of some matters of concern to the auditor. Some are caused by differences between accounting standards (for instance accounting for Commonwealth operating grants received in advance in the case of UTS) and information reported compared to DETYA instructions (regarded as immaterial in the cases considered). Some in the case of USYD delayed the Audit report and involved substantive testing due to an apparent lack of appropriate financial controls. In the case of UNSW the matters highlighted by the auditor were timely supporting working papers, accounting for work-in-progress, lack of written procedure covering the use of fuel cards. In view of such difficulties the small percentage of audit fees to total revenue appears surprising -for instance 0.05% for UTS (A$115,900 fee out of revenue of A$246.6 million) and 0.09% or A$528,000 fee compared to A$586.0 million revenue in the case of USYD. Also upon inter-university comparison, certain universities have reporting practices that appear to promote accountability. For instance breakdown of activities by campus (UWS) rather than an overall approach (UTS). Or breakdown by activity, particularly of the return on investment income and consulting (NSW). Investment activities comprise a major part of total cash inflows and outflows of the universities due to timing differences between receipts and payments, 19 not just of public sector funds but of private sector. UNSW shows detailed breakdowns of its investment income (A$17.3 Million or 2.8% of total revenue -comparing returns to an objective yardstick) and details of its external funds managers. No such information is supplied by the other two universities. UNSW also leads best practice in reporting executive remuneration of staff earning more than A$100k similar to disclosure requirements for public listed companies. UTS and USYD, although UTS discloses academic salaries, all of which are below A$100k. Common to all the universities is that as a means of accounting for expenditure annual reports are of limited usefulness to key stakeholders, due to flaws in DETYA instructions in terms of the categories of expenses that shall be reported, and the wide definition of academic activity.
Areas of deficiency highlighted by an inter-university comparison
20 This is not just in the reporting of academic as opposed to non academic activities highlighted above in Section 2.1, but in accounting for administration costs. As Walker (2000, p. 3) has pointed out Australian universities have not only adopted the practice of "top slicing" budgeted revenue to fund indirect service costs or "charging" faculties on the basis of quantum of services provided, then allocating the residual to internal budgetary units, but also adding "on-costs" to researchers' salaries funded by external grants, taking quantity rebates from suppliers to central administration while charging academic units for gross amounts, crediting central administration with interest revenues generated from the investment of short-term cash surpluses (including research funds' balances). Overall this system referred to as "fund accounting" 21 which does not track spending once funds leave the "centre" can result in the misreporting of expenditure types. 22 It appears that the three universities studied use fund accounting as expendable resources are matched against the uses of these resources to ensure that managers are not overspending or building unnecessary surpluses. Fund accounting also reports the use of restricted as opposed to non-restricted resources, to ensure accountability and reduce the risk that restricted funds are not used for their intended purpose. From external analysis and careful reading of the notes it appears that the category of "administration" rather than salaries of teaching and research staff is consuming an undue proportion of funds. The recent "West" review of the need for analysis of administrative efficiencies and the need to provide information about costs and cost structures seems more pertinent than ever (West Report, 1998, p. 90) .
3.2
Areas of deficiency highlighted by a public-private sector comparison It is only by comparison with private sector companies that the advantages of extra information contained in university reports is apparent (both qualitative and budgetary forecasts) but also deficiencies become glaringly obvious, such as the lateness of accounts (most universities balance 30th April, but accounts unlike a listed company are not available within 3 months), valuation practices, lack of detail (although largely due to DETYA categorisations as pointed out above) and even the inconsistencies contained with budgetary forecasts when compared to the actual financial statements (detailed by Walker, 2000) . Universities and public listed companies all have the same categorisation of information -assets, liabilities and residual claims, except that there is no shareholder's equity in the universities as nonprofit organisations are defined as enterprises formed for social, educational or philanthropic purposes, which normally have no transferable ownership interests and from which the members or contributors do not receive any direct economic gain. shareholders' equity is replaced by accumulated funds. They are also exempt from corporations tax. One noticeable difference between the financial structure of the universities and public companies is the lack of debt, apart from provisions and accrued liabilities. Details of sources of revenues and expenses on a fund accounting basis are provided for universities unlike public listed companies. The ability to identify needs and purposes which are then communicated through the budgetary process as a basis for securing the funding required is a factor totally unique to universities as reporting entities distinct from public listed companies. Such reporting is dictated by the need for compliance reporting as well as lobbying to maintain the level of funds or increase that level. Public listed companies are attempting only to inform investors re current and potential returns. Universities will disclose a measure of return which can be regarded as indicating managerial efficiency -the excess or deficiency of revenues over expenses, but their is not the same motive to maximise it as this could lead to reduced funding in the following year. Hence they will disclose commitments or plans for unexpended funds and identify future needs through formal budget information. Unlike public listed companies they will disclose the extent of outsourcing or use of consultants -2.6% of revenue for UTS, 2.8% for USYD and 1.8% for UNSW. Unlike public listed companies they do not revalue regularly the largest proportion of their assets, comprising 39% for USYD (having the largest holding of A$1.1 billion out of total assets of A$2.8 billion), 71% for UTS, and 59% for UNSW. This structure is one which will be discussed in the last section as an avenue for freeing up cash flow. One aspect that is noteworthy is the lack of intangibles in the balance sheet. Although hard to accumulated unless through takeover or float, the worth of the university lies in the intellectual property of its human resources and hence this asset merits discussion of how it is best measured and reported. However before doing this, this study examines whether objective corporate financial analysis reveals any answer to the assessment of public and private partnerships in universities. teaching and research, or research only activities" (DETYA, 1997b, par. 3.2) . 21 Unallocated funds not spent because of unfilled vacancies many be reallocated to expenditure on travel or entertainment. 22 Walker (2000), p. 4.
4.0
Efficiency, Liquidity and Sustainable growth measures applied to Australian Universities Due to the fact that most universities are unlisted, heavily subsidised, non-profit organisations, it is difficult to assess creditworthiness and investment feasibility. However a comparison with UNSW and USYD highlights differences in operational performance and management expertise (see Appendix 1). These ratios are also compared to DETYA yardsticks in order to both assess the performance of these universities. Sustainable growth cannot be calculated as universities do not pay dividends and all profits are retained. The current ratios of two of the three universities are greater than the DETYA range of between 1.5 -3, with the quick ratios showing a similar adverse comparison for UNSW. However more indicative is debt capacity which is normal compared to commercial companies for UTS and UNSW, ranging between 2-5 years, but totally adverse for USYD in 1999. These ratios improve dramatically to 0.43 years for UTS and 0.42 for UNSW in 1999 when the accrued provision for superannuation is removed from the long term debt. However as far as DETYA is concerned a University is healthy in terms of liquidity if fortnightly operating costs are covered 6 times by liquid assets net of scholarships and research grants. Apart from mixing flow and stock costs, the best indicator of liquidity for a corporation is debt servicing ability or cash adequacy. As universities have little external debt apart from creditors and provisions, and lease commitments, other ratios are used to assess the liquidity of public listed entities, such as, • the defensive interval (the number of days liquid assets could meet daily operating expenses) -UTS had a ratio of 121 days in 1999 (143 days in 1998) while USYD was 88 days (189 in 1998). UNSW was the lowest at 75 and 79 respectively ; • the cash conversion cycle (the number of days a business need to complete the cycle of cash, inventory, debtors, cash net of the number of days of free credit received) -UTS had a cycle of 123 days (141 in 1998) days compared to UNSW of 108 days (122 days in 1998) . The cash conversion cycle is also a measure of efficiency.
• net operating cash flow to total operating assets -UTS was 7.71% in 1999 compared to 5.1% for UNSW. At first analysis these universities appear liquid. If we measure efficiency by the cash conversion cycle (reducing) and by the return on sales and equity (refer to Appendix 1 which shows UTS outperforms the other two universities) all three universities appear efficient to a greater or lesser degree. However to make any valid conclusion regarding the efficiency, the liquidity and sustainable growth of the three universities briefly analysed, a longer time series is needed. Although all of the above ratios appear healthy (except for the University of Sydney (due to a negative operating cash flow in 1999, and UNSW in its current ratio in 1999), the objective of a university is pursuit of excellence, and provision of courses that satisfy all agents and principals. A university could have a payout ratio of 1 month, but it may be the result of stringent expense cuts in replacement of equipment of decrease in the ratio of staff to student numbers. Such quality deterioration could lead to student dropouts and fall off in demand. Hence the assessment of the quality of output is essential to devising increasing public/private sector partnerships.
5.0
Qualitative measures of the success of private and public partnerships in tertiary education -teaching, research and innovation Typical measures of the performance of a service industry, such as financial services, are the contributions to profit and revenue from full time equivalent staff (ie NPAT/FTEE). Since universities are neither tax paying entities or whose objective is the maximisation of wealth of its shareholders, the measure of profit and revenue is not meaningful. Despite this proviso it is interesting to note that both UTS and USYD recorded a surplus of revenues over expense giving a return on equity in 1999 of 4.86% and 1.01% respectively. The accumulation of funds in a university can then be used for special projects at the Council's discretion, such as the internal administration of research funds, travel grants, purchase of additional out of budget land and buildings and so on. In Section 2.1, government measures of performance (DETYA, 1999b) were contrasted to other measures produced by private studies (Marginson, 1999) to illustrate how even the selection of such measures is subject to agency conflicts. Neither of these measurement methods incorporate any quality measures, resting solely on monetary or statistical quantification, and also ignoring overseas measures such as staff/student ratios. The latter is often measured by the universities themselves on an institutional wide basis ignoring the strains posed on popular faculties such as business, information technology/computing studies where the ratio can be as high as 400:1. Meek and Wood (1998) in their taxonomy for classifying universities put forward a qualitative output scenario which appears more congruent with current government intentions as enunciated in the "Innovations Statement". They measure outputs of teaching by the number of graduates in different fields and levels. This would involve tracking those graduates over their working life. Research is divided into two types -'discovery' which contributes to fields of study and disciplines, and applied and strategic, which contributes to professions, industry and policy. Both types of contributions involve a high degree of subjectivity, such as peer assessment. Academia can also contribute in the public sphere, such as to debates about contemporary issues, involvement in community service. UTS as a new university in contrast to the oldest "sandstone" USYD, appears to follow the Meek and Wood's method of measurement, emphasising its university awards, its research funding increases from industry and government linked to qualitative measures, its new doctorates, its new approaches to teaching, course developments, contributions to the community (such as the Olympics) and providing considerable detail on its research centres and projects. Other quantifiable measures of consulting income, or revenue from innovations in processes or products are hard to capture as consulting is often undertaken by an academic in a private capacity, and innovations and inventions are sometimes subject to intellectual property disputes and/or not commercially exploited by universities due to their bureaucratic structures. A solution to the latter problem would be to allow universities to establish venture capital arms in conjunction with industry to be run on commercial lines, with contracts entered into with academics which embody their rights to intellectual property. The present status is that the university claims ownership of any writings, inventions and innovations of an academic despite the fact that many academics work in their own time, home and undertake research and teaching far in excess of an average standard working week.
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Given the decline in public funding caused by either a decline in propensity to fund, or an increased emphasis on reducing government spending and a political inclination to promote globalisation and liberalisation in tertiary education, with market incentives being the predominant driving force, the logical conclusion to questions examined in this discussion is whether Australian universities are creditworthy or attractive to private sector investors. Such an analysis has applicability to other economies with the same characteristics as the Australian economy (current account deficit, high foreign debt per capita, domestic surplus in the public sector, and a low savings ratio particularly at the household level 24 ) which are considering the same questions of the possibility of increased private/public sector partnerships.
6.0
Are Australian Universities suitable lending and investment prospects for the private sector? This analysis will proceed by taking UTS as a case study using the ratio and qualitative analysis in the two previous sections, conduct a scenario analysis, and then proceed to attempt to answer this question. In analysing the investment returns of UTS (see Appendix 1 for calculations of return on sales and equity for three universities), the returns are rather low compares to less risky investments such as government bonds (4.9% vs 6.7%). Since universities pay no dividend (and appear to need to continually reinvest to meet competition) and there is no comparable price/earnings ratios, potential market value cannot be estimated. A private investor would consider the certainty of continuing government grants, student fees and private sector donations as well as any avenues to reduce expenses without affecting the ability to attract students and research funds. The dependence on government grants is illustrated in Appendix 2. Hence although UTS as an institution appears creditworthy from the type of private sector analysis and DETYA yardsticks (detailed in Section 4.0), future debt servicing and payout ability must be questioned due to the current level of competition, decreased government funding and the questionable ability of a corporate and household sector that is evidencing dissaving (Loundes, 2001 ) to fund higher education in Australia. Hence without government grants UTS appears a non-viable option (see Appendix 2). To test this finding a scenario analysis for UTS was conducted. If the government were to fully privatise UTS, assuming this is possible, this scenario would involve zero provisions of government grants, producing a negative operating cash flow. The following analysis will look at what possible measures can be taken to make UTS a viable investment without reliance on government grants. Appendix 2 shows a breakup of current revenues. Excluding the government grants, a scenario of "privatised -sustained" looks at how the university could maintain its current revenues by adjusting fees received to cover the loss of grants. This scenario would require an 83% increase in both HECS paying students and other students, a solution that may be unachievable give the present demand and supply for tertiary students. A second scenario of "privatised-adjusted" looks at an adjustment to spending that will allow lower levels of turnover. This requires an increase in HECS paying students of 9.8%, which could be achieved by a tightening of the terms of trade regarding accounts receivable. The increase from postgraduate and international student fees is estimated at 55%, achieved by an increase in fees of 9.8% and the numbers of international students by 2,500. Appendix 3 shows the current level of fees per student against scenarios which do not contain the benefit of government grants. Scenarios 1 and 2 show different ways of achieving the current revenue levels. Due to a judgement that neither scenario 1 or 2 is feasible due to the need to increase too dramatically all student numbers, (international, post graduate and HECS paying), Scenario 3 is postulated -it assumes a 9.8% increase in fees across the board and a 63% in international students only. The above scenarios explored substitution of private fee income for government grants. Three other scenarios were explored of expense reduction depicted in Appendix 4. Scenario 1 removes government grants equally through all segments of expenses, while Scenario 2 focuses on reducing costs in the areas of Support Services, Public Services and Buildings. With the proposed adjustments to revenues, the university will have a higher level of funds at their disposal. Scenario 3 allocates the adjusted revenues according to their apparent need, focussing on funds provided to Academic and Library Services, as these are areas through which UTS maintains its reputation appeal to potential students. Currently the university spends A$9,187 per student per year. With the proposed addition of 967 international students, as well as the necessary cost cutting, cost per student will fall to A$8,035 per student. This represents a fall of 12.5%. It is therefore important for the university to ensure this decrease will not have a negative effect on the quality of educational services provided. Privatisation of UTS would result in the loss of governments grants which would make the operating result significantly negative. One way to make the university viable would be to make the following changes • decrease expenditure by 12.5% causing cost per student to fall to $8,035 per year;
• accommodate an additional 967 international students bring the total to 2,500, using some of the funds from floating the university in an international advertising campaign; • increase student fees across the board by 9.8%. The effect these changes will have on the Profit and Loss Statement is only to reduce losses to nil. To achieve profits, more significant changes would be necessary. This may have quality impacts depending on where costs were reduced -central administration vs academic activities. At the moment UTS appears typical of Australian universities to lenders and investors -high risk and low return. 7.0 Conclusion Whether the goals of management are the same as its shareholders, Australian universities are being pushed towards more dependence on the private sector for funds. The scenario analysis and analysis of reports from an agency paradigm and using objective measures reaffirms the West report findings of possible administrative inefficiencies. This would indicate, • the necessity to appoint a waste watch at each university particularly in the area of administrative and property expenditure as well as to DETYA itself. As pointed out by Walker, if DETYA's role is merely to fund universities, which are to be self administering, why is such a large staff of 157 required (Walker, 2000, p.17) , • the examination of holdings of land and buildings to explore sale and leaseback, • the establishment of mechanisms to recognise the intellectual property rights of academics and establish a means of encouraging joint ventures between the university and industry to develop that intellectual property including at a very basic level, publishing, • an examination of the method of determining the remuneration of academics which rewards those with a higher teaching load and introduces market mechanisms into wage negotiation. Current proposals to encourage research and development neglect the fact that by international standards academics in Australia are grossly underpaid and universities are having difficulties in attracting and holding staff.
• the need for establish corporate governance mechanisms within universities so that the views of all stakeholders can be heard. The present structure of universities is a top down approach to strategic planning The above analysis also indicates that universities are non viable without government grants -private sector funding may have reached the maximum level without severe effects on the quality of output, unless administrative cost cutting and fee and student increases as proposed above could reduce dependence. However global competition may make fee and student number increases untenable while more private sector funding as a goal of governments towards universities will not work in an economy where "thrift" as measured in macroeconomic terms is at all an all time low.
